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FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTION UNDER THE




 to the Cleat? Air ACtlienagtgl three years prior to
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 2 provides that "the prevention and
control of air pollution at its sout4 is the primary responsibility of
State and local governments . . ."a While that congressional finding
is still §CiPewhat. aCcillAte as a description of the respective spheres of
the authority of state and federal governments in the control of air
pollution, the enactme,nt of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 sig-
nificantly increased the extent of federal regulation of this area. 4 This
altered federal role, resulted from burgeoning public concern regarding
the health hazards posed by air pollution 464 the previously
pate response to the problein by both state and federal governments.°
The regulatory scheme established by the Clean Air AMendrnents in-
volves total federal preemption of some area  (emission controls for
new motor vehicles and aircraft emission stand_ ards),° partial federal
preemption of others (new source performance standards and hazard-
Otis emission standards}' and, finally, a sphere in which states have
-	 •	 •
► Carleton' College, 1968; j.p, Harvard University, 1971. The author is an
attorney in the Enforcement Division, fnvfronmental PrOtection Agency (EPA),
Region I. The views expressed herein are 'those of the author. They do not represent the
views of the P,PA	 apy other agency.
l• 42 U.S.C . Rf. 1857	 e t seq. (19-70).
2 Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
▪ 42 U.S.C. f 1857(a) (3) (1970).
4 For discussions of the federal programs in this area prior to 1970, sec Comment,
A	 ryHisto of Federal Air Pialution Control, 30 	St. L.J. 516 (1969); "o'Frition, De-
ficiencies ~in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 fqw tonieinp. Prob. 275 (1968). For a
critique of the 1970 legislation, advocating national source emission standards for all
sources, rather than just for new, sources, sea Note, Clean Air Act. Amendments of 1970:
A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 Geo. L.J. 153 (102),
8 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st tong„ 2d Sess.'1.-2 (1970); H. Rep, No. 91-1146, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970).
42	 §§ 1857.1,6a(a) and -11 (1970). he former provision forbids states
and their political Subaiyisions to adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to
the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicls engines subject
to §§ 18571-5a to -7 of the Clean Air Act; the latter provision provides that no state or
political subdivision thereof may adopt or attempt to enforce any standard respecting
emissions of any air pollutant from any aircraft or engine thereof unless such standard is
identical to a standard applicable to such aircraft under. §§ 1857f,9 to ,12 of the Clean
Air Act.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6 and -7 (1970). States are forbidden by these provisions from
adopting or enforcing emission limitations with more lenient standards than the minimal
standards set forth therein.
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relative freedom to adopt and enforce emission limitations as long as
they comply with certain basic strictures of the Amendments.'
This article will examine several issues arising from the interaction
of state and federal law in the adoption and enforcement of emission
requirements to attain and maintain national ambient air quality
standards. Two broad categories of issues will be examined: first, those
arising under air pollution control plans adopted by the states and
approved by the federal enforcement agency; second, those arising
in connection with federally promulgated plans. Specific topics in the
former category include the extent to which state interpretations of
regulations contained in air quality implementation plans are binding
on the federal government, the extent to which federal law permits
states to revise implementation plans, and finally the status as federal
law of state regulations submitted to and approved by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) where the state agency's adoption
of the regulations exceeded its authority. The issues to be examined
in the second category concern state enforcement of federally promul-
gated implementation plans and the limits of the EPA's power under
the Clean Air Amendments to revise the legal authority of state agen-
cies to control air pollution.
Friction has already arisen between state and federal governments
with regard to the issues in the first category. For example, as will be
seen below, the Rhode Island Department of Health has been dis-
turbed by federal enforcement actions in that state which have been
based on an interpretation of the state's regulations contrary to the
state's own interpretation.' At one time the State of New Hampshire re-
fused to forward certain point source variances to the EPA for approval,
although, after considerable pressure had been applied, it did submit
them." Limitations on the states' power to interpret and revise their
own air pollution control regulations is a significant and, potentially
at least, an unwelcome intrusion into a field where previously they
possessed complete autonomy. Friction can only hinder the cooperation
between the two levels of government which is so essential to the ac-
complishment of the goals of the Clean Air Amendments. It is hoped
that this article's discussion of potential problems arising from federal-
state interaction will suggest answers, or grounds for answers, that will
help to reduce such friction. Indeed, it is a premise of the article that
resolution of the problems it presents must not only be consistent with
the congressional scheme but must also allow the federal government
8 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (1970). This section deals with state adoption of implementa-
tion plans to attain and maintain air quality standards and is the focus of discussion in
this article.
0 See discussion in text at notes 26-34 infra.
10 See discussion in text at notes 59-62 infra.
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and the states to present a united front in efforts to preserve and im-
prove the air resources of the nation.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Before examining these problems of state and federal interaction,
it would be useful to outline briefly the sections of the Clean Air
Amendments dealing with implementation plans. Pursuant to section
109 of the Clean Air Amendments," the EPA, the federal agency
charged with the overall responsibility for administration and enforce-
ment, promulgated national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards for various pollutants. 12 Primary standards specify the levels
of concentration of those pollutants in the ambient air" above which
there are identifiable health effects,14 while secondary standards specify
levels beyond which the effects on public welfare are adverse." These
standards are uniformly applicable throughout the nation.
Following promulgation of the national standards, each state was
given nine months to adopt—after public hearing—and submit to the
Administrator of the EPA plans for the implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement of the standards within each air quality control region
in the state." The Administrator was given four months following the
date established for such submission to approve or disapprove the
plans." He was required to approve a plan that met the specific require-
ments set forth in section 110(a)(2),18 one of which provided that a
plan implementing primary standards must require that the standards
be attained "as expeditiously as practicable" but no later than three
years from the date of the Administrator's approval of the plan, and
that a plan implementing secondary standards must provide for attain-
11 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
12 The pollutants covered are those which have an adverse effect on public health
or welfare. The presence of such pollutants in the ambient air results from numerous or
diverse mobile or stationary sources. 42 U.S.C. 1857c-3 (1970). The pollutants for
which standards have so far been promulgated are carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,
photochemical oxidants, sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter. See 36
Fed. Reg. 22384 (1971).
13 The federal regulations define "ambient air" to mean that portion of the at-
mosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access. 36 Fed. Reg.
22384 (1971).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (2) (1970). The definition of public welfare is very broad,
including, but not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made ma-
terials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate; damage to and deterioration of
property; and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on
personal comfort and well-being.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1) (1970).
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ing those standards within a reasonable time. 19 Once the standards are
achieved, the Amendments require their continued\maintenance. The
Amendments preserve the right of states to adopt and enforce plans
which impose emission limitations stricter than necessary to attain
and maintain national standards, 2° If a state fails to submit an imple-
mentation plan within the time prescribed or submits a plan, or portion
thereof, which the Administrator determines does not comply with
statutory requirements, the Administrator is required to promulgate a
plan for that state which does meet the criteria of section 110(a)(2).21
At the heart of an implementation plan are the regulations by
which it limits
 emissions from stationary and/or mobile sources to the
extent necessary to attain and maintain national standards." Whether
these are adopted by states and approved by the Administrator or,
alternatively, promulgated by the Administrator when a state fails to
submit an approvable plan, they become federal law on approval"
or promulgation and thereafter are enforceable by the EPA pursuant
to section 113 of the Amendments24 and by private citizens pursuant to
section 304."
10 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2)(4) (1972).
20 42	 § 1857d-1 (1970). This provision states:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 209, 211(c) (4), and 233 (preempting
certain State regulation of moving sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce- (1) any standard . or limitation respecting emissions or air pollutants or
(2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that
if an emission standard or limitation is in effect 9 piicr an applicable implementa-
tion plan or under section Ili or 11.2, such State or political subcilvisiori may not
adopt or enforce any emission standard or iirciitation which is Tess stringent than
the standard or limitation under such plan or section.
21 42 U.S.C, § 1857c-5(c) (1970). The Administrator formally approved or disap:-
proved state plans on May 31, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 10892 (1972). Only a few plans were
found to be totally approvable on that date, see, e.g„ id. at 10854 (Connecticut), and
id. at 10879 (New Hampshire). In the rase of other plans, some states have corrected
all of the deficiencies as of this writing, see, e.g., id. at 23088 (Maine), finally, in
some instances, the Administrator, on his own, has promulgated portions of plans to
correct deficiencies, see, e.g., id. at 19811 (Rhode iSland and Vermont.),
22 The other required provisions of an implementation plan are set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 1857c,5(a)(2)(A).(11) and elaborated in 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (191), "Re-
quirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Flans," as
amended, id. at 20513, 25233, and 26310.
28 Approval of a plan and the regulations contained therein results in the adoption
of the state law as federal law and is considered ruIe,making subject to the requirements
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (1970).
24 42 U.S.C. 1857c,8 (1970) provides in part as follows:
(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Admin,
istrator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable
implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of the
plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation
extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification,
the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with the
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IL ISSUES ARAIND UNDER FEDEEATAY APPRQvpo
SrTAg PLANS
A. The Extent to Which State Interpretations of Regulations
Contained in Air Quality Implementation Plans Are Binding
op Federal Instrumentalities
1. Newport, Rhode Island: A Case in point
The problems analysed in this section can be conveniently illus-
trated by a case that arose soon after the passage of the Clean Air
Amendments of 197Q, One of the first federal enforcement actions
taken under section 113 (a) (1) of the Amendments' raised the ques-
tion of the extent to which a state agency's interpretation of its own
regulation, which regulation has been included in a federally,apprpved
implementation plan, is binding on the federal government in its en-
forcement of the plan, The action involved the City of Newport, Ithode
Island.
Newport operated a municipal dump which was open to all resi-
dents of the city to deposit refuse for disposal without fee; commercial
haulers were required to pay for the use of the dump. Material coming
into the dump was separated into those materials which could be dis-
posed of in the city's incinerator, principally household garbage, and
material which could not be burned because it was either too large to
fit into the incinerator or noncombustible. Incinerator residue was
landfilled on one section of the land used for the dump, Before the EPA
intervention, large combustibles, mainly demolition debris from wooden
housing torn down during urban renewal, were burned in open fires on
another section of the dump, on land owned by the city,
Regulation No. 4 of the Air Pollution Control Regulations of the
Rhode Island Pepartrnent of Health provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to burn any material in
_	 .
requirements of such plait or he may bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b).
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Admin-
istrator finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so wide-
spread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which
the plan applies to enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the
Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after such
notice, he shall give public notice of such finding. During the period be-
ginning with such public notice and ending when such State satisfies the Ad-
mtnistiator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred to in this section
as "period of federally assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce
any requirement of such plan with respect to any person,
(A) by issuing an order to comply with such requirement, or
(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b).
g$ 42 U.S.C. § 11357h.-2 (1970).
Ra 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
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an open fire on premises operated as a public or semi-public
refuse disposal facility, at'other central refuse disposal sites,
or in connection with any salvage, industrial, commercial, or
institutional operation. 27
This regulation, which had been in effect for some years, was included
in the portion of the Rhode Island implementation plan approved by
the EPA in May 1972. 28
 Since 1967 the Rhode Island Department of
Health had interpreted Regulation No. 4 as not prohibiting open burn-
ing of demolition debris as long as the burning occurred on an area
segregated from the part of a municipal dump used for disposal by
other methods, e.g., landfill, so that underground dump fires would
not be kindled. The reason given for this interpretation was that dis-
posing of demolition debris by any method other than open burning
was difficult. 2°
Given the facts that Regulation No. 4 applied to municipal corpora-
tions" and that the area where the burning in question occurred was
clearly a public disposal area, the sole remaining question in the New-
port case was whether the demolition material could be classified as
"refuse." The open burning prohibition,. by its terms, was applicable
only to "refuse" disposal sites. The Department of Health took the
position that as long as demolition material was burned separately
from other types of solid waste, it would not be considered "refuse."31
Such an interpretation of the term "refuse" appeared to be con-
trary to the weight of authority on the subject." Moreover, the Depart-
inent's interpretation, which permitted all the cities and towns in the
state to open-burn large combustibles, had not been submitted to the
EPA as part of Rhode Island's control strategy for particulate matter,"
27 This regulation is to be found in the Rhode Island Implementation Plan, which
is on public view at the Health Building, Rm. 204, Davis Street, Providence, R.I.
28 37 Fed. Reg. 10891 (1972).
29
 Remarks of Mr. John Quinn, Director of the Solid Waste Division, R.I. Dep't of
Health, In the Matter of the Town of Middletown, R.I., EPA Conference Transcript (un-
published), Nov. 6, 1972.
80 R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 23, ch. 25,	 23-25-3 (1968).
81 Remarks of Mr. John Quinn, supra note 29.
92
 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Refuse" is defined for purposes of 33 U.S.C. 1 407 (1970) as "anything which has be-
come waste, however useful it may earlier have been." A standard textbook on solid
waste defines "refuse" to include, .inter alia, demolition and construction wastes. Institute
for Solid Wastes of the American Public Works Ass'n, Municipal Refuse Disposal 10
(1970).
22 The federal regulations define "control strategy" as the combination of measures
(including, but not limited to emission limitations) designated to achieve the aggregate
reduction of emissions necessary to attain and maintain the national standards. 36 Fed.
Reg. 22369 (1971). The federal regulations also require that emission limitations and
other measures necessary for attainment and maintenance of national standards be
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and accordingly the EPA had not taken that interpretation into con-
sideration when it evaluated the adequacy of the Rhode Island plan
to attain and maintain national standards for particulate matter. In-
deed, it is questionable whether the EPA could have approved that
portion of the plan had that interpretation been brought to its attention.
Rejecting the state agency's interpretation of Regulation No. 4, the
EPA issued a notice of violation and abatement order to the City of
Newport pursuant to powers granted by section 113 of the Clean Air
Amendments." Newport's compliance with the EPA's order mooted a
challenge to the EPA's action. Nevertheless, the conceptual problem
this case presented remained unanswered: to what extent is a state
agency's or a state court's interpretation of a state-adopted regulation
included in a federally approved implementation plan binding on the
EPA or federal courts? The likelihood of judicial resolution of this
issue in the near future appears substantial.
2. Alternative Approaches to the . Problem
The Clean Air Amendments nowhere expressly provide an answer
to the annoying question posed . above. In cases arising under other
federal laws involving federal adoption of state law," the courts have
found state interpretations to be binding on federal agencies where
the statutory scheme demanded that result." Where, however, the state
adopted as rules and regulations enforceable by the state agency. Copies of all such
rules and regulations are required to be submitted with the plan.
The Rhode Island Plan, which is available for public inspection at the Health
Building, Rm. 204, Davis Street, Providence, RI., makes no reference to the Department's
interpretation.
84 In the Matter of the City of Newport, Rhode Island (unpublished EPA order,
issued January 11, 1973). At the date of this writing, Newport has ceased all open burning
of demolition debris at its dump and has made arrangements for landfilling material
formerly burned.
86 See, e.g., the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), which pro-
vides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereaftei reserved
or acquired guilty of any act or emission which, although not made punishable
by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which
such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or
omission, shall be guilty of a like offence and subject to a like punishment. .
Cf. § 209 of the Coal Mine Safety Act, Act of May 7, 1941, ch. 87, 55 Stat. 177, as
amended, Act of July 16, 1952, Pub. L. No. 552-877, 66 Stat. 703, which required
certain precautions to be taken before electrically driven equipment could be operated in
a "gassy mine." "Gassy mine," within the meaning of the Act, was defined as any mine
found to be "a gassy or gaseous mine pursuant to and in accordance with the law of
the State in which it is located." Id.
as See, e.g., RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946), where the Supreme Court
held that a state court interpretation of the term "real property" was controlling in
determining what property of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was subject to state
and local taxation under § 10 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, Act of
June 10, 1941, ch. 190, 55 Stat. 148, which permitted taxation of certain types of real
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1 94fglY ca LEA !NPLA5,113.4g 4.M4 CP,AtigfliCIAL Mt!' PITT
interpretation conflicts with express §t4ttitng-langtiMq or ether
cm! PPliqles PT con stitutional	 1 1.CciF91.1s	 1. 1 1:47
gate that the federal government is pot bound thereby.f,
this connection it must be noted that section 141(a)(3) of t4C
C1,04n Ants§t1i9gelit requirements, appli-
cable to 'plan revisions Apd, together with section 1 .16,6
 requires, fed-
eral overseeing of any plan modification in order to prevent a state
from so weakening a plan that it Nyeig,4 fail. -to attain air quality sta,p,
dards time by Congress. It could hardly have tlqe:q
the intention of Congress to permit avoidance of those provisions by
allowing states complete freedom to hlterpret,tfieir air pollution; con?
regulations and making such hlterpEet4titIti§ lylnding on the federal
pvemineht,
. Pn the qt4g• 4gnAz .§Pq09n§ 149(g)
	 11§4 , 9i - the AnwPc17
ments preserve the right of the states to adopt, and enforce whatever
emission standards they choose as long as those regulations are adequate
to attain and maintain national ambient air quality standards within
the time frame prescribed 42 It would appear, then, that the states
property; Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 224 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1955),
a case arising nadir the Coal Mine Safety. Act, Act of May 7, 1041;. ch. 87, 55 Stat. 177,
WIN?* 049 S1.9-544CIVIO,a 	 mine as a '.gassy," mine within the PW.aalig of theAct yeas, hefts!oe bindi ng on the Petra] Coal Mine Safety Board of Review. Cf.
McCoy v. PesCor, 148 1'.2c1 . 150 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. 'denied; 324 U.S. 686, rehearing
denied, 325 V.S. 891 (1945); 1211W9CI States v. 414922, 158
 V. 9 0 SI:!./sr.J; 1908) ; Note,
 Feder, Assimilative Crimes 44, 79 Hary. L, . key; 685 (10.0),.
gT Sep, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 T.S. 78, 80, (0401, where the Supreme
Court, in discussing the effect of state on federal tax policies,'sta'ted that "(i)f it is
finnid'in a givencal% that an interest or right created by 1661 law Was the object lritenileil
to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name is Oren to the interest
or right by State	 Smayda v: United States, 452 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 190), where
the court held that, in a proCealink under the Aistilia
-tin C-Tinl.eisAcf, 	cilles14911 n.if
whether evidence was unlawfully obtained under an unreasonable search and seizure is
(E.D.a federal question; Air Terminal seryiret Inc; y. Ren4e1, si F. supp. 61'1	 Va.
1949), where it was held that federal policy tigaiiiit
	 aiion presented
assimilation of Yirgipia segregation laws at Washington National Airport pursuant to
the Federal 4.5404tiye ciim4 Act.
k a Pia	 submitted t.?..
	 RA part ofthe state's implementation plan and the EPA, taking the interpretation into account,has evaluated' apd approval the control strategy as satisfying the regPiremenis of
the Ait, the federal goAierrinient sihould be bound by the interpretation. As will ge argued
immediately belOW, the state should be free iointerpret its plan as lon§ as such inter
Pretations Win not prevent attainment of air quality goals :
42 	 1857c.75(a) (3) (147{31)..
a? 41	 IgM-t' (1976).{ 1857e,5{a)(2) 0970 ;
91	 1857i1-1 (1970).
42 Section 116 of the Clean Air. Amendments preserves the right of the states to
adopt and enforce emission limitations stricter than, the necessary to attain the minimum
 quality standards required by the Ameutinients.	 1§574;1 (197) 3.iiin,ted'
Nil II? 11,64. 18, supra. AllowingfederalfreedomI? avoid stricter4interpretations of 44.1: own ifegaktni and to apply weaker fe0er..0 interpmtatIons,
hilt12;10W*
should retainsorrie With& in interpreting their" federally approved
rettilatioifS. Finally , any approach to the fifibleth at iSSite &Wit
iiiiiftifihitY in the inteiiireta.tibli Of the 'Sahib "regulation's by bbth féd'efal
gild State - gOVetifihiefitS 'dna SO Mid efiliftisibli on the Daft
of the sources as to what is demanded With regard elhigibil 'ciRitrelt
In order to solve these difficulties and to comply with the policies
of the Clean Aif AiriehdinehtS, the f011d*ifig aplirbacii to thiS problem
appears appropriate : The states should be free to interpret the regula-
tions,contained in their federally approved implementation plans,, and
such interpretations should be binding On the EPA and the federal
courts in cases where the state interpretation will not prevent the
attainment or maintenance of national air quality Standards within the
time frame established by the Clean, Air Amendments 4 8 If a state in-
terpretation would prevent the attainment or maintenance of national
standards within the congressionally mandated time schedule, the EPA
should have the right to adopt and enforce any reasonable interpreta-
tion of the regulation necessary to attain and maintain required air
quality levels ; although no stricter than necessary 4 4 giich an interpre-
tation would bind the state agency and state courts under"section 116
of the Amendments,"
This approach will not interfere with the air quality goals of Con-
adequate to attain only minimum iedirai air quality goals, would contravene the Delley
of section 116.
In additicin, section 110(a)(2) of the Amendments appears to allow states the right
to adopt plans barely, adequate to attain and maintain national standaidi.
§ 1857a-(ii) (2) (1970). TO alibi/ federal iiiiiiijnientalities to ifiterpiet gate 	 hi a
more itifet faabion than intended by the State Mid stricter than necessary to meet
federal air quality standards would apparently violate the policy underlying section
110(a) (2).
In a recent case, Sierra dub v: Ruck- eliimus; — F.2d —; 4	 air.),
aff'g 344 F. upp. 253 (D:D.t. 1972); cert. .granted, 41 3392 Jan.
15; 1973); the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ,held _ that State
plans must provide against significant deterioration of existing, air quality. This deciSiOn
would satisfy that the states would be required, under the Clean Air Amendmeniii;
adopt plans not only adeqUate to attain and maintain /lade:hal air . quality siandardi,
but also adequate to presette air quality. in locations where that quality had been abc,mie
national standards prior to plan adoptions, Nevertheless; even under the rationale of thii
decision, the states appear to retain the right to determine how strict their plans. should
be as long as national air quality goals are achieved within the time frame priA'ided by
the Amendments.
43 If the nonciegradation argument of Sierris Club v. Ruckelshaus, siiima note 4;
prevails, any, such state interpretations must, of course, .conform to that decision:
It would seem conceivable that an interpretation might not interfere With attainment
of air quality, standards, but would, in some areas, permit degradation of air quality.
In this cage; it appears that different interpretations ,applying to diiierent parts of the
same state might be justified, without being susceptible to an equal protection challenge
on the grounds of arbitrary discrimination,
44 If the nondegradation argtiMent succeeds, any EPA interpretation would have
to conform to it,
45 42 U.S.C. 9 1857d-1 (1970).
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gress expressed in the Clean Air Amendments. It would preserve the
right of states to adopt and enforce emission limitations as long as they
are adequate to achieve those goals, and would provide for the uniform
interpretation of federally approved regulations whether enforced by .
federal or by state governments."
B. State Revision of a Federally Approved Plan
Once the EPA has approved a state plan and the regulations con-
tained therein have accordingly assumed the status of federal law, a
question arises as to the extent of state power to modify the original
plan. Given the purpose of the Clean Air Amendments to attain and
maintain national air quality standards within a particular time (rime,
resolution of that issue becomes important in those cases where a state
wishes to change ari implementation plan to make its emission controls
lesi stringent than those originally approved. For example, a state might
wish to modify a regulation by permanently exempting certain sources
from its coverage or by raising the level of allowable emissions for all
sources subject to the regulation. Moreover, state laws usually permit
temporary variances from -air pollution control regulations in cases
where a source would suffer "undue hardship" by complying with the
prescribed degree of emission control." In fact, since the EPA's
original approval of implementation plans in May 1972, a considerable
number of states have granted such variances; Massachusetts alOne
has granted more than a dozen regarding its regulations limiting, the
sulfur content of fue1. 4  The question of the extent to which states may
grant such variances was raised by the Natural Resources Defense
40 As an,alternative to the approach suggested above, it might be argued that if
a state interprets the federally approved regulations in its plan in such a manner that
the plan is inadequate to achieve air quality standards, the EPA Administrator can require
the state to revise the plan to remedy the deficiencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (H) (ii)
(1970). However, as long as a regulation is susceptible of an interpretation which
results in a control strategy adequate to achieve air quality goals, a revision would not
accomplish anything of substance that could not be achieved by merely adopting such an
interpretation. Neither the express terms nor the intent of the Clean Air Amendments
requires that the revision route be followed in lieu of such an equally effective means
of remedying a deficiency in an approved plan. Furthermore, the revision approach
may involve considerable delay, given the statutory requirements for reasonable notice,
public hearing, and EPA review of any proposed revision. See 42 US.C. 1857c-5(a)(3)
(1970)'.
47  See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 23, ch. 25, § 23-25-15 (1968); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
10, ch. 15, § 361 (1972).
48 The EPA has approved several of these pursuant to section 110(a) (3) of the
Clean, Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970). See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg.
16178 (Pepperell Paper Co. in Pepperell, Mass., and Haverhill Paperboard Co. in
Haverhill, Mass.). It has disapproved others. See, e.g., id. at 23837 (General Electric Co.
in Pittsfield, Mais., disapproved in part).
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Council in recent cases challenging EPA approval of certain implemen-
tation plans."
The provisions of the Clean Air Amendments that deal with the
problem of defining the limits on the states' authority to modify ap-
proved plans are sections 110(a) (3)," 116,5' and 110(0." Section
110(a) (3) provides as follows:
The Administrator shall approve any revision of an imple-
mentation plan applicable to an air quality control region if
he determines that it meets the requirements of paragraph (2)
and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and
public hearings."
It is important to take note of the time frames established in sec-
tion 110(a)(2) 64 for the attainment of national ambient air standards:
primary standards are to be attained as expeditiously as practicable but
not later than three years from original plan approval (mid-1975), and
secondary standards within a reasonable time.55 EPA approval of a
plan revision pursuant to section 110(a),(3) 5° does not start the three-
year period running anew except in the case of revisions to take ac-
count of revised primary standards."
As section 110(a) (3) makes clear, the EPA Administrator must
49 See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, Civil Nos. 72-1224,
and 72-1219 (1st Cir., filed June 30 and June 28, 1972). These cases challenged EPA
approval of the Massachusetts and Rhode Island implementation plans, respectively.
50 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) ( 1970).
tit 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (t970).
52 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
53 42 U.S.C. { 1857c-5(a) (3) (1970).
94 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970).
56 42 U.S.C. f 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (1970).
50 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970).
57 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970) provides for the Administrator's approval of
a plan if, inter alia:
(A) (i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air
quality standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as
expeditiously as predictable but (subject to subsection (e)) in no case later
than three years from the date of approval of such plan (or any revision thereof
to take account of a revised primary standard); and, (ii) in the case of a plan
implementing a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies
a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be attained.
The fact that this provision explicitly permits extensions of the three-year deadline
in the case of one type of revision (a revision to take account of a revised primary
standard) and not in the case of others indicates that extensions in other cases are not
permissible. In fact, it would have made no sense for Congress to establish rigid deadlines
for achievement of health related standards ("Air quality standards protective of the
health of persons must be achieved within the 3-year period of the approval of plans
to implement ambient air quality standards," S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1970)) and permit extensions of those deadlines every time a state chooses to
revise its plan.
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approve any revision of a plan meeting the substantive and procedural
requirements of section 110(a) (2). The EPA has taken the position
that no revision can displace the requirements Of an applicable plan
until it has been so approved," While the Clean Air Amendments and
the regulations promulgated thereunder do not define the term "revi-
sion," it appears to be the EPA position that the term inchides any
modification, permanent or temporary, of the specific emission controls
of an approved implementation plan, regardless of whether the change
affects one particular source or a whole class of sources and regardless
of whether the change strengthens or relaxes the controls of the plan.
New Hampshire has questioned that interpretation." Alleging that
section 110(a) (3) uses the term "revision" to refer Only to changes in
eniisslon controls wbith are applicable to an entire state Or air quality
control region, the state denied the EPA's authority to regulate the.
granting of variances to particular point sources and has refused to sub-
mit several variances to the EPA for approval." This interpretation
appears to be based on the fact that Section 110(a) (3) talks in terms
of the EPA's power to approve "any revision of an: implementation
plan applicable tb an air quality control regiOn:"° 1
 Moreover, the state
noted,°2 even if individual variances to particular point sources are not
submitted to the Administrator for his approval, the EPA can still
ensure that implementation plans are adequate to achieve air quality
standards, because the Administrator has authority to require states
to revise their plans if it appears that they are substantially inadequate
to achieve air quality goals.
However, it is submitted that such a narrow Interpretation of
section 110(a) (3) cannot be sustained. First, all air pollution sources
are located in air quality control regions° and a variance given to a
single point source can clearly be classified as a revision "applicable
to an air quality control region," albeit not applicable to all sources in
the region. Secondly, section 116 of the 'Amendments" forbids a state
to adopt or enforce any emission Standard or limitation less stringent
than that in effect under an applicable plan. By its terms, section 116
is not limited to actions affecting more than one source. A variance gen-
erally includes a limit on emissions" from the Source to which it is
6s 37 red. Reg. 22369 (1972).'
sg These questions arose in the context of informal disttgAionS between Neel
Hampshire state officials and EPA attorneys concerning the necessity; for EPA approval of
certain variances granted by the State.
60 Eventually, after extenSiVe pressure from the EPA, Neill:,
 Hampshire did submit
the variances to the EPA for approval though reserving its rights.
01 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970).
62 See note 59 supra.
es 42 U.S.C. 1 1857c-2 (1970).
64 42 U.S.C. I 1857d-I (1970).
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granted ; and even if a particular variance doeS not control emissions
CO any degree, that absence Of control can itself be classified as an
"êtnia:Sien Standard:" Therefore the prohibition of section 116 would
encompass the situation Where a state grants a variance to a single
point source and thereby ekeriipts It ftimi the einission controls Of the
applicable plan.
An "applicable implementation plan" is defined by the Amend-
ments as the plan or the most recent revision thereof whiCh 115S  been
approved or promulgated by the EPA!' Consequently, until the Admin-
istrator has approved a change in the emission controls Of a plan—
whether the change affects a single source or a class of sources—the
state IS foreclosed from granting any relief from its regulations as
originally approved. 'MIS the contention of New HaffipShire that the
EPA has no authority to regulate the granting of variances by a state
to individual point sources has no merit,
The Clean Air Amendments use the tent "revision'' in Several
places, most notably in instances where a plan is required to be made
more stringent than as originally approved 0° The argument haS been
made. that section . 110(a) (3) refers back and applies only. to Such
modifications and therefore does not apply in those instances Where a
state is seeking to relak the controls of its plan ; for example by granting
variatideS.61  HOWeVer, the legislative history _Of section 110(a) (3)
strongly indicates that Congress did not intend to confine the use of
that provision in such a way. Rather, the Amendments appear to con-
template that, following EPA approval of . the original plan, Under
section 110(a) (3) a state can modify the plan in any way it chooses ;
whether by telaiing Oe by :Strengthening its emission controls on a
permanent Or temporary basis, as long as the plan, as inodified, Meets
the substantive and procedural requirements imposed for approval of
the original plan.
Prior to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Clean Air
Act contained a proVision, very similar to section 110(a) (3), that
clearly allowed States to revise their inipleinetitatiOn plans as long as
65
 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(d) (1970).
66 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(a) (2) (H) (1970), which states that a State Ptah
ftkuat
Efithiiide] för revisieb, aftet piitilie heal-toga; of 'Sikh plan (i) froth time to
tithe as ihaY be necessary to take account Of revisions of such national prifithty
secondary ainbierit air quality standard or the availability of improved Or
there expeditious rtietliods-
 of achieving such Priiiiitik or secondary Standaid;
Or (ii) Whenever the Atiinitilitrater finds On the basis of itifetfilation
Stile to him that the plith is eithetaiitiallY inedkiititte to achieve the national
ariibieht air iluitlitYr pFIieaty Or Sectifidebi alerts:laid *hid' it implements.
sr See ;
 e.g. ;
 COtisolidated Reply Brief Mr Petitioners at 4A; National Resources
Defehbe OMURA the, v. EPA, Civil NOR: 72 .-4224 and 72-1219 (1st Cir., filed lane 5:11
and Julie 28, 29725:
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the revisions complied with the criteria applicable to the original
plans." The House version of the bill that was to become the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 provided for the same type of statutory
scheme." The Senate bill contained no provision for revisions com-
parable to section 110(a) (3), but instead referred to revisions of 'an
approved implementation plan only in those instances where the re-
strictions contained in the plan were tightened." Nevertheless there
°8 Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 11 108(c)(1), 81 Stat. 491. This section
provided:
If, after receiving any air quality criteria and recommended control tech-
niques issued pursuant to section 107, the Governor of a State, within ninety
days of such receipt, files a letter of intent that such State will within one hundred
and eighty days, and from time to time thereafter, adopt, after public hearings,
ambient air quality standards applicable to any designated air quality control
region or portions thereof within such State and within one hundred and
eighty days thereafter, and from time to time as may be necessary, adopts a
plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such standards
of air quality adopted, and if such standards and plan are established in accord-
ance with the letter of intent and if the Secretary determines that such State
standards are consisted with the air quality criteria and recommended control
techniques issued pursuant to section 107; that the plan is consistent with the
purposes of the Act insofar as it assures achieving such standards of air
quality within a reasonable time; and that a means of enforcement by State
action, including authority comparable to that in subsection (k) of this sec-
tion, is provided, such State standards and plan shall be the air quality standards
applicable to such State. If the Secretary determines that any revised State
standards and plan are consistent with the purposes of this Act and this sub-
section, such standards and plan shall be the air quality standards applicable
to such State. -
(Emphasis added.)
ae H.R. 17255, § 108(c)(1), quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 26 (1970), provided in part:
If a state which has such a plan fails within 60 days after notification by
the Secretary or such longer period as the Secretary may prescribe to revise it
as required pursuant to subparagraph (C) (iv) or the last sentence of this para-
graph then such State shall be regarded for purposes of paragraph (2) as not
having such a plan. Any revised State plan which the Secretary determines is
consistent with this subsection shall be the plan applicable to such State. At such
time as the Secretary, after consultation with the State, determines that the
achievement of an air quality standard under section 107(e) requires inspection
of motor vehicles in actual use and that such inspection is technologically and
economically feasible, the State shall revise its plan to provide for such in-
spection.
(Emphasis added.)
While this provision might be interpreted in the same way as the provision in
note 57 supra (i.e. the term "revision" applies only to modifications strengthening a
state plan), such an interpretation could hardly have been the intention of the House.
The House bill gave the states wide flexibility regarding the manner in which and
the time when air quality standards were to be achieved. Such standards were to be
attained in a "reasonable time." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970).
To permit states to revise their plans only when the plans, as revised, would be more
stringent than they originally provided would not be consistent with such a scheme.
70 Those instances included situations: (1) where national standards are revised
(§ 111(a) (2) (I)) ; (2) where the plan is inadequate to attain national standards within
3 years (§ 111 (e) ) ; (3) where improved or more expeditious methods of achieving the
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was no indication during the Senate hearings, 71 in the report accom-
panying the bill to the Senate floor," or in the floor debates on the
bill," that a state was precluded from modifying an approved plan
where the modification only satisfied, instead of exceeding, the same
standards as those applied to the original approved plan. The confer-
ence report made no explicit reference to the applicability of section
110(a) (3), but neither did it anywhere indicate a congressional intent
to lock states into implementation plans as originally approved unless
modifications would hinder timely achievement of air quality stan-
dards."
It is very hard to imagine why Congress would have intended to
restrict states' power to change their plans as long as the revised plans
would achieve the congressional goals of attaining healthful air quality
as expeditiously as practicable but no later than 1975, and air quality
protective of the public welfare within a reasonable time. For example,
a small fossil fuel utilization facility may be located in an air quality
control region where the air quality is better than either the primary
or the secondary national standards for sulfur dioxide. Assuming that
this source of pollution is subject to a strict state-wide regulation limit-
ing the amount of sulfur in the fuel used, it would appear that regula-
tion of that particular facility's output of sulfur dioxide is totally un-
necessary to the attainment and maintenance of the region's air quality
standards, and accordingly state regulation of such output is not a
prerequisite to EPA approval of the state strategy in the first instance.
Therefore for the state to modify its strategy by excluding the facility
from regulation, whether on a temporary basis or permanently, would
not appear to run counter to the purpose of Congress as expressed in
the Clean Air Amendments." Another example would arise where an
air quality control region has particulate emissions exceeding the pri-
mary air standards and accordingly must be regulated by the state by
standards are developed (§ 111(a) (2) (I)) ; (4) where a state wishes to attain a higher
level of air quality than is specified by a national standard (§ 112); and (5) where
the state wishes to attain and maintain the level of air quality specified by a national
standard in less than three years (§ 112). All references to sections above are to the
Senate bill, S. 4358, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sem. (1970).
71 Hearings on S. 4358 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Air Pollution-1970, pts. 1-5
(1970).
72 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
73 116 Cong. Rec. 32837, 32900-28, 33072-121, 42381-95 (1970).
74 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
75
 The illustrative value of this example is not destroyed even if the non-degradation
rationale of Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus is considered. See note 42 supra. If the effective
date of the regulation at issue has not arrived, removal of the source from the control
strategy will not result in deterioration of existing air quality.
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means of strict source tOtitrbla, Askiiiie that the state first "sets January
1974 as the effettiVe date of the regulation needed to attain thOge
standards and that after its plan has been approved it find that the
control technology fot athieVing compliance Within that tithe fraind
will not be available but tOtild be installed by jatitiaty 1975. It would
appear consistent With both the express  terthS Of the Clean Air &nen&
nienta and the goals of that legi§latiOri to permit the state to modify
its Original estimate Of how "eicpeditithiSly" "sources tOtild be expected
to comply by extending the final cOnipliante date to 1975." Whethet
the Administrator reviews an original plan under section 110(a)(2)
Or a pecipb§ed revision of an approved plah Under section 110(a) (3),
he has the same atitheitity to ensure that the state's plan will be tide,
quate to attain and Maintain air quality standards within the pre=
'scribed time frame.
Atitithet provision Of the Anieridinerita. Whith is relevant to the
question Of the antinifity of a 'State to inodify its -plan is section 116,
Whit- h forbids States fr•Oni adopting or enforcing emission standards Or
limitations legs Stringent than those hi effect tinder-
 applicable plaits."
A literal interpretation Of thiS provision WOUld 'appeal to forbid a state
tti grant any variance Or Other relaxation of etrii§siOn controls even
though it intended to §ulithit the revision to the EPA fot approval:
HOWdVet, in the Afriendinent§ CinigreSS evidenced ho such intent to
lock states Intl) implementation plans as initially approved ; as long as
any revisions to thoSe plans meet the substantive and procedural re ,
tlitiretheritS Of section 110 applicable to the original jilatiA.78 Rather,
section 116 Alithild be read as requiring states to condition any Varian -et§
they grant On EPA approVal,.thefeby feirding states to Subniit thetri to
the Administrator for Stftitity litittét "section 110(a) (3).
Under section 110(a)(3) ; the EPA hits authority to approve post.
poneihents of final compliance dates Of regtilatibn§ itieliided in State
implementation plans as originally approved. That authority has re-
78
	
Air Amendments require attainment of air quality goals, as eipedl-
tiously as.practicabk,but no later than 3 years from plan approVal. 42 180e-t
(a) (2) (A) (1970). It has been argued that ,once a state submits a, plan to the EPA,
the schedules for compliance contained therein reflect the state's estimate of how "ex-
peditiously" sources can be expected to comply, and the state cannot latir change that
estimate. See Consolidated Reply Brief i'Or Petitioners at 8-4; National iteiources Defense
Council, inc. v. EPA, Civil Nos. 72-1224 and 72-1219 (1st tin, filed June 30 and
June 28, 1972). Such a position has no support in the, legislative history , or express
provisions of the Clean Air Amendments. It appears totally consistent with the Amend-
ments to permit states to revise their estimates of how eii5editirnislY_SoiiiieS Can comply
as long as there is adequate suppOrt for such revised judgMents and final coinjiiiince is
not delayed past nild11975.
77 42 U.S.C:	 1857d-1 (1970).
78 See text at notes 50.58 supra: •
GLEAN Ant itilittitiNiAlt.§:
Gently been Challenged:" Instead, it has been urged that Stith peStpene ,
ineritA, tegardleS§ Of theft effect oh the attaintherit Of rhairiteharite Of
national Standardk can be granted, if at all, Only pursuant td Settiiiii
110(f) of the AtnendiriehtS, iVhith StateSt
Prior to the date on which any stationary source Or Class of
moving sources is required to comply with any requirement
of an applicable implementation plan the Governor of .the
State to which such plan applieS may apply to the Adminis-
trator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to
Stith Stotitte (Or da.§§) for tint more than One yeti'. If the
AdininisttatOf detetinifiéS that—
(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with
such feqUitethentS before such date;
(B) such "source (et class) is Unable to comply with
such requirement because the necessary technology or other
alternative ihéthOdS Of control ate not
	 or Katie not
been available fel.a suthclent petiod Of
(C) any available alternative operating procedures and
interim control irieetifes haVe fedtited or will reduce the
impact of such source on public healthy
 and
(D) the continued operation of such sauce is essential
to national aactitity or tb the public health Or Welfare, then
the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such it-
quireintnt,
	 .8°
Given the strict iiattire Of the StiliktaiitiVe fetitiirefilentS this section
establiSlieS or panting One-Year peStpOilettientS and the inability of
most sources to make the showings it requires, it would appear that
the aiiktésted interpretation, that would Make "section 110(f) applicable
to all requests for postponement of compliance datek is unreasonable.
Such wholesale application would result in wholesale denial of those
requests, even in cases where the source's failure to comply with appli-
cable regulatiOna would have no effect on the attainment or maintenance
of the national standards within the time frame established by the
Amendments. Such a result is certainly net required fOr the achieve-
ment of the congreSsional purpose of attaining certain levels Of air
purity by a particular date.
we mom-give hiSiefy of Section 110(f) indiOateS that Congress
intended it to apply only to a very narrow class of cases. Of all the
" Bee, e.g., NatUral Resonttea Defense Council, Inc: ,. EPA, Civil Nos: 12=1224 and
72-1219 (1st Cir., filed June 30 and June 28, 1972).
Bo 42 U.S.C. § 18576:5(f) (197b):
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drafts of proposed legislation considered by.Congress in 1970 to replace
the,1967' Air Quality Act, only one ,contained a provision similar to
section 1.10,(f). Section 111(f) of:S. 4358, the Senate bill that went to
the Conference Cominittee from which the 1970 Clean Air Amend-
ments emerged, contained language that is analogous to section 110(f)
of the Amendments. 81 Another provision of the Senate bill imposed a
rigid three-year time frame in WhiCh to attain health-related air quality
standards." The Senhte report' apparently proposed section 111(f) as
a resporiSe• to the problems inherent in that time scheme:
81 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970). This provision stated:
(f) (1) No later than one year before the expiration of the,period for the attain-
ment of ambient air of the quality established for any national ambient air
quality standard pursuant to section 110'of this Ad, the Governor of a State in
which is located all or part of aw,air quality control region designated or
established pursuant to this Act may file a petition in the district court of the
United States 16 the district in which all or a part of such air quality control
region is located against the United States for relief from the effect of such
expiration (A) on such region or portion thereof, or (B) on a person or persons
in such air quality control .region. In the event that such region is an inter-
state air quality control region or portion thereof, any Governor of any State
which is ,whay, or partially included' in such interstate region, shall be per-
mitted to. intervene .for the presentation of evidence and argument on the
question of such relief. .
(2) Any action brought pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and de-
termined by a, court of three' judges in accordance with the provisions of section
2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court. Proceedings before the three judge court, as authorized by this sub-
section, shall take precedence on the docket over all other causes of action and
shall be assigned for hearing and decision at the earliest practical date. and
expedited in every way ... .
(4) The court, in view of the paramount interest ,of the United States , in
achieving. ambient air quality necessary to protect the health of persons shall
grant' relief only if it determines isuch relief is essential to the public interest
and the general welfa're of the persons in Such region, after finding-
. , (A) that substantial efforts have been made to protect the health of persons
in such region; and
(B) that means to control emissions causing or contributing to such failure
are not available or have not been= available for a sufficient period to attain an
applicable standard; or	 •	 . ,
(C) that the failure to achieve such ambient air quality standard is caused
by emissions from a Federal fa.cility for which the President has granted an
exemption pursuant to section 119 of this Act.
(5),The court, in granting such , relief shall not extend the period established
by this Act for more than one year and may grant renewals for additional one
Year Periods only after the filing of anew petition with the court .
(7) No extension granted pursuant to this section shall effect compliance with
any emission requirenient, timetable, schedule of 'compliance, or other element
of any implementation plan unless' such requirement, timetable, schedule of
compliance, or other element of such plan is the subject of the specific order
extending the time for compliance with such' national' ambient air quality
standard.
82 S. 4538, $ 111(a) (2)(A), quoted in S. Rep. No: 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 87
(1970).
654
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS: FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTION
Finally, the Committee would recognize that compliance with
the national ambient air quality standards deadline may not
be possible. If a Governor judges that any region or portions
thereof within his State will not meet the national ambient air
quality standard within the time provided, [section 111(f)
of] the bill would authorize him—one year before the dead-
line—to file a petition against the United States in the District
Court of the United States for the district where such region
or portion thereof is located for relief from the effect of such
expiration."
Thus the purpose of section 111(f) of the Senate bill was to per-
mit a one-year postponement of the attainment date for health-related
standards by extending the time for compliance with regulations aimed
at achieving those standards in cases where sources lacked the tech-
nology necessary to comply or had been granted a presidential exemp-
tion from compliance. In presenting the Conference Committee's work
to the Senate for its consideration, Senhtor Edmund Muskie, manager
of the bill, made a statement revealing that section 110(f) of the
Amendments was intended to serve the same function as section 111(f)
of the Senate bill:
A governor may also apply for a postponement of the
deadline [referring to the deadline for attaining primary stan-
dards] if, when the deadline approaches, it is impossible for
a source to meet a requirement under an implementation
plan, interim control measures have reduced (or will reduce)
the adverse health effects of the source, and the continued
operation of the source is essential to national security or the
public health or welfare of that State."
The Conference Report further confirms this characterization of
section 110(f):
Under the Senate amendment [t] he Governor of a State, how-
ever, was authorized to petition the Federal district court to
extend for a year the period for attaining a standard. The
court could grant relief only upon specified showings and
each one-year extension could be granted only after the filing
of a new petition and making the required showings . . . .
The conference substitute follows the Senate amendment
in establishing deadlines for implementing primary ambient
air quality standards but leaves the States free to establish
88
 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970).
84
 116 Cong. Rec. 42384-85 (1970).
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a reasonable time period within Which secondary ambient air
quality standards will be implemented. The conference Substii
tute modifies the Senate amendment in that it allowt the Ad=
ministrator to grant extensions for good tanks shown upon
application by the Governors."
.
The implication of this statement is that the conference substitute
was intended to modify section 111(f) of S. 4358 in only One respect:
the power of granting one-year postponeinentS was to be in the Admin-
istrator in the first instance and not in the federal courts.
It would appear, then, that section 110(f) was intended to apply
only in those instances where a variance or other postponement of the
effective date of a regOlation would prevent attainment or maintenance
of primary air quality standards within three years from plan approval:
This is the interpretation of section 110(f) that has been adopted by
the EPA" and approved in a recent case arising under the Clean Air
Amendments."
The ekpreSs terms of section 110(f) do not demand a different
result. If the legislative purpose Underlying the section is kept in mind,
its references to "any stationary source or class of moving sources"
and to "any requirement of an applicable implementation plan" need
not be interpreted as requiring that all postponements of final compli-
ance dates of regulations satisfy the etiteria, it Set§ forth. Rather, the
statutory language is intended to indicate that a One-year paStpOnement
which prevents attainment of primary air quality standards iS available
to any source with respect to any regulation contained in an approved
control strategy as long aS the §tibstantiVe and procedural criteria of
section 110(f) are met.
Section 116(6) of the Athendtnentsil A	_permits the Ad-
.._..._
86 H.R. Rip_...JnTo. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1970) ( emphasis added).
88
 The federal` regulations provide:
A State's determination to defer the applicability Of any portion(55) of the control
strategy with respect to such source(s) will not necessitate a reqiunit for post=
ponement under this section (Section 110(f)1 unless such deferral will prevent
attainnient or maintenance Of a nitibhal standard within the dine *killed In
such plan: Noilidett hbweveri that h.ny such deterthination will be deemed a
revision of an applicable plan under I 51.6.
36 Fed. keg. 22398 (071).
87 Getty Gil Co. V. RiieltelShitis, 467 P.M 349 (3d Cit.), afrg 342 F. Seipp: 1006
(D. Del. 1972); This interpretation of section 110(f) has recently been challenged. See,S7
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA) Civil Nos. 72-1224 and 72-1219
(1st Cir., filed June 30 and June 28; 1972), where petitioners asserted that all PaStpone-
ments of compliance Milk rim the gauntlet of Stetibri
88 42 U.S.C.	 1857Cz5(e) (1970). This section provides:
(e) (1) Upon application of a Governor of a State at the time of submission
of any Mail inipleinenting a national ambient ait quality jirithity stindatcl, the
Administrator may (subject to paragraph (2)) extend the three-year period
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ministrator to grant a two-year extension Of the three-year deadline for
attaining primary air quality Standards applicable to a particular air
quality control region if the governor of a state requests such relief at
the time when the original implementation plan Is submitted to the EPA
and if certain rigid criteria similar to those set forth In section 110(f)
are satisfied. Thus it cannot be maintained that Congress ruled out all
postponements of deadlines for achieving primary air quality goals.
Section 110(e) permits Such extensions at the time of plan submittal
when it is foreseen that they will be necessary, Section 110(f) gives
a state, following EPA approval of its plan, the opportunity to reassess
its ability to obtain compliance with its regulations in time to meet the
primary standard deadline imposed by the Amendments and to Obtain
limited relief from the expiration of that deadline.
Accordingly it seems reasonable to conclude that the 1970 Clean
Air Amendments present a coherent scheme for revisions of state
implementation plans by states. In this schemes "revision" of a plan
includes any modification Of the - specific emission controls contained
therein, whether strengthening or weakening the plan, whether appli.
cable to a single SOnrce Or to a class of sources, A state may revise its
plan in any Manner it wishes (e.g„ by granting postponements of the
final corlipliaute date§ Of its regulations Or by removing sources from
the control strategy) as long as the plan . as revised, meets the criteria
for original plan approval set fOrth in section 110(a) (2). Section 116,
however, requires that all Mk/1816E1S be adopted subject to EPA ap-
prOV6.1, Until the Administrator approves of a plan revision as conforth.
it* to the requirements of section 110(a) (2) ; the original implernenta
referred to in subAettion (a) (2) (A)(f) for not more than two years for an
air quality control region it after review of Stith Plan the AdininiStrator deter
mines that—
(A) One or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable
to comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary
standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not
available or will not be available soon enough to permit within such three-
year period, and
(B) the State lies considered and applied a9 a part of its plan i'ea.senably
available alternative means of attaining such priMary standard and his
justifiably concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the
three Years cannot be achieved.
(2) The Adinhilstrator May grant an extension tinder paragraph (1) only~ if he
determines that the State pleb provides for—a
(A) application of the requirements of the plan which implement such
primacy standard to all emission' sources in such region other than the
sources (or classes) described in paragraph (1) (A) within the three-year
period, and
(B) such interim measures of control of the sources (or classes) described
in paragraph (1)(A) as the Administrator determines to be reasonable under
the circumstances.
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tion plan is enforceable by the federal government and by private
citizens pursuant to sections 113 and 304 respectively."
As noted earlier, one of the criteria for approval of an original
plan is that the plan be adopted after reasonable notice and public
hearing and provide for attainment of primary standards as expedi-
tiously as practicable, but no later than three years after plan approval,
and for the attainment of secondary standards within a reasonable time
from plan approval.90
 Approval of a revision does not start the three-
year period for reaching primary standards running anew except where
the revision is made because a primary standard has itself 'been revised.
Therefore, subject to EPA approval and the three-year primary stan-
dard deadline, a state may revise its estimates of how expeditiously
sources can comply with emission limitations designed to attain primary
standards and its estimates of the reasonableness of the period allowed
for attainment of secondary standards. To the extent that a revision'
would, inter alia, prevent the attainment or maintenance of the national '
standards within the congressionally mandated time frame, it must be
disapproved by the EPA.
The only relief from the three-year primary standard deadline is
found in sections 110(e) and 110(0.9' When it is foreseen at the time
of plan submission that the deadline for primary standards may not
be met, in very limited circumstances the Administrator may extend
that deadline for a period of up to two years. Following plan approval,
the Administrator may postpone the applicability of any emission lim-
itations included in a plan with respect to any source or class of sources
for not more than one year, delaying attainment of primary air quality
standards beyond three years from original plan approval if the con-
ditions set forth in section 110(f) are satisfied.
C. Status as Federal Law of Federally Approved State
Regulations That Are Beyond the State Agency's
Power to Adopt
Troublesome problems arise from the scheme of federal-state in-
teraction envisioned by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 when a state
promulgates an air pollution control regulation, such as an emission
limitation, which is beyond the substantive regulatory authority of the
promulgating state agency. The same problem occurs where a state
adopts a regulation in a proceeding that fails to comply with applicable
89
 42 U.S.C. $ 1857c-8, h-2 (1970). These enforcement provisions attach to plans
approved or promulgated by the Administrator.
90
 See text at notes 16-19 supra. If the Sierra Club challenge, supra note 42, is
successful, there is one further requirement. A revision may not permit significant de-
terioration of air quality.
91 See text at notes 79-88 supra.
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state administrative procedures. If the regulation is subsequently ap-
proved by the EPA as part of the state's implementation plan, and the
defects in the state adoption of the regulation go unnoticed until after
the time has expired for states to submit acceptable implementation
plans, the question may then arise as to the status of the state regula-
tion as federal law." The likelihood of this issue being presented in
actual cases would appear to be significant, given the large body of
regulations adopted by states and approved by the EPA in a relatively
short period of time.
It would appear that as long as the regulation is sufficient to attain
and maintain national air quality goals within the time periods pre-
scribed by the Clean Air Amendments, - but no stricter than necessary
for that purpose, and that federal approval was not procedurally de-
fective," the regulation should be considered part of the state's imple-
mentation plan, enforceable by the federal government and private
citizens. That is, federal approval should be considered tantamount to
promulgation of the regulation and should override any defects in the
state's procedure. Under section 110(c), the EPA may.promulgate
regulation applicable to a state where the state fails to submit a satis-
factory regulation. However, disapproval of the defective regulation in
this case and promulgation of the same or a similar regulation would
not accomplish anything of substance.
Where, however, a state regulation, in fact invalid under state law,
is stricter than necessary for the timely attainment and maintenance of
national air quality goals, it would appear that the EPA would have to
disapprove the defective regulation and promulgate another one for the
state complying with the requirements of the Amendments. While the
EPA has authority to promulgate a plan or a portion thereof for a
state where the plan submitted by the state fails to satisfy therequire-
ments of the Amendments, the EPA does not appear to possess the
power under the Act to promulgate a state plan stricter than necessary
to satisfy section 110(a) (2)." 4 As long as the excessively strict state
92 When a defect in a state regulation is discovered before the lapsing of the time
period that § 110 of the Clean Air Amendments provides for states to adopt approvable
plans, 42 U.S.C. § I857c-5 (1970), the state obviously has an opportunity to correct the
defect. If it fails to avail itself of this opportunity, the textual discussion should apply.
Thus, where the regulation is necessary to attain air quality standards and federal ap-
proval of the regulations is not procedurally defective, that approval should be con-
sidered promulgation of the regulation pursuant to § 110(c) of the Amendments. 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970). •
93
 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ SOO et seq. (1970), and § 110 of
the Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), set forth the procedures for
federal approval and promulgation of plans.
94 The Clean Air Amendments nowhere explicitly place such a limit on the EPA's
promulgation authority. However, to the extent that the EPA promulgates a plan that
is more stringent than necessary to attain the air quality goals of the Clean Air Amend-
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regulation is considered Part Of the federally enfOrdable ihiplehietitä=
den Plan ; federal approval -*aUld constitute the eqUiValeili Of federal
piiinfulgation Of such a regulation, since in theSe circumstances the
ferte and effect Of the regulation would depend set* Oh federal la*.
Therefore such federal approval could het Stand. The eilfereeabilitY
by the state's theiriSelVd of regulations invalid under 'State la* but Valid
titidee federal la* will be considered in the felleWing section.
III. ISSUES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITii tEbtitAtiN'
PROMULGATED PLANS
A, Enforceability by States of Federally Promulgated
Emission Limitations
Settled 116(d) Of the C lean Air Ahiehditiehte5 provides fOr
federal promulgation Of eriiissibn liiiiitationg When a state either fails
to submit an ithpleilientatidu plan *Rhin prescribed time litriit's Or
siilirrlits a plait .Whidh did het measurete "statutory require"'trients:
At the date of thi§ *fiat*, the EPA has 'fait0O§ed of filially proffit&
gated fegillatieh§, st5irie Of Whith are emission Iilrlitations, 88 to Shh§titilté
for disapproved parts of more than thirty-five state
The proposition that a 'Staid can enforce ari eliiiggien
menti (including non.cligradition where applicable), it is using its authority under the
Amendments to extend federal power beyond the purposes of the legislation. It could
lia"rdly Have beenthe intent of Congressthat f 11C0(c) be utilized in that inariner. The
OhilegOtihy of the Artieritirfiehts is CO leave to the states thE authority to regUlate sources
mare strictly than required by the . goalS of the Act: 42 U:S:C:§ 1857th1 (1970); see
S. itep.. No: 91-1196,.91st Cang., 2d: Sess. 15 (1976), where it is stated that qaltates,
localities, inter-eiunicipal and interstate ageneleP 'they eat:A Staiidfirdi and Wang to
tiehleive a higher leVel Of amliicnt airEitiality thin approved by the SeefetafY:"
95 42 U.S;C: § 1857c-5 (1970). This seetion . pfovides:
The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing. record,
promptly piéPafe and publish proposed 'regulation 'Petting fOrth an ihiblefainia:
flail Plan, Or purti in thefeei, Idr 0 State
(1) the State fails to submit an bnplementation plan for any national am-
bient air quality primary,or secondary standard within the time prescribed,
(2) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is determined
by the Administrator hot to lie 10 atcordaace with the ficiiiiiiniefiti of
this section, or
(3) the .State	 within 60	 after'nOtifiatiOn by the Administrator
Or such iOngei 	 period as lie eiiay jiresi ribe, to revise
as required pursuant tei a provision Of its plan referred to in iuhieEtiori
(a)(2)(ii), of this section.
If such Stite held no public hearing as—tiElated with respect to
revision thereof), the Administrator shall provide , opportunity fof inch hearing
Within such State on anyregulation. the Administrator snap, within
six hint:Alia lifter the date required foi subriiiOOion of OUCh Plan (or
thereof), promulgate any such regulatiofig unless , prior to such promulgation,
such State has adopted and iubthittect a Pidii (or"	 WhiCh the Adrilinis-
tiger determines to be is Reel:in:like With the reCniiiiiienta of this
id See,	 39 fed. Reg.	 19866-15, 19824-37, 23085-93 (1992).
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PY9111Plgat4 for it 13,y the PA Adgglij§tigtgr has been 090.14 bY
the EPA47 y:10 is glppgrted by the legislative history of the 19 clean





olents, Legislation considered by both the House and Senate contain_ eq
provisions expressly indicating such an intention. Furthernigre, the
requirement under section 113(a) of the Amendments" that the EPA
give thirty days' notice to a state before undertaking federal, enforce-
4. • - ••	 •y---•..	 •-	 _ • - a«,	 -,••--•	 •,-
41 Id. at 1046..
98 Section 7 of a bill considered by both the House and Senate provided in part;
(A) Whenever, on the 'basis of surveys, studies, or reports the Secretary finds that
the ambient air quality in any State or the area under the jurisdiction of any
interstate air pollution' control agency faili to meet the air quality standards
established pursuant to section 107, and be determines, 91 1 the basis oj facts thus
ascertained, that such failure results from the failure of a State or interstate
agency to carry out its plan (or. the plan provided for. it by the :Seerektry) under
section 108(e), the Secretary shall notify the State or the interstate agency,
99-4 the persons contributing to the hiwering of the air quality or to the alleged
violations of such findings.'
(A) If such State or interstate agency has not taken appropriate remedial
action within ninety days of such notification, the Secretary may request the
Attorney general to bring suit on behalf of the United States in pa appropriate
United States district court to enjoin vfolaiion of applicable standardsorregula-
tions by any person within that State or the area under the jurisdiction of any
interstate air pollution control agency.
Hearings on S. -4358 Before the 'Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess., Air Pollution---1970, pt. 1, at 39 (1970);
Hearings on Air Pollution Centro] and Solid Wastes Recycling Before the Subcomm. on
Public Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
44-, 9tig,, .gos., 1, at 178 (1970) (emphasisidded),Section 112 of the House	 whieh eventually was a guideline for the 1970 Clean
Air Amendments, proVided:
	
(1) Ifs within such period as 111.19! be	 by t119. Secretary, any
State or interstate
	 13.9.14149!! control agency,	 a 0.0 for enforcement of
the emission standards promulgated by the SeCietar3i under this section, such plan
shall, if the Secretary determines it provides adequately for ihe enforcement of
such emission standards, be applicable within such State or other area.
(2) If a State does not adopt a plan in accordance with paragraph (1)
of this suhseCtion,the Secretary shall, after reasonable notice and a conference
with representatives of appropriate Federal departments and agencies and State
agencies, prepare regulations,establishing an enforcement plan for such State.
If, prior to the date the Secretary publiihes such regulations the State has
not adopted such plan, the Secretary shall promulgate siiclt regulations.,
(C), If 4 any	 secretary4441.20.11CP 14t 	 person is viPlatingthe P:.m.,!usIga, standard established0.0	 section, and thathe State or iritrratate ageticy is failing to carry out Ilsg, pan' adopted
provided sYkseckcM. (0(1) Pr establishedprovided (4(4he shall notify the af ected State or the interstate agency and the person
CiffPg tjle emission standard, and shall specify the time within 1,411ch stich vi9.1417
tion must cease.
H.R. Rep. No. 9f-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970) (emphasis added). While this
provision dealt with enforcement of federally promulgated new source standards rather
than with ambient air quality standards, it clearly indicates that the House contem-
plated state enforcement of plans promulgated by the federal government. T
U8 42 U.S.C. Q 1857c-8 (1970).
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meet action under an applicable plan, even when the plan has been
promulgated by the EPA,'" indicates that Congress contemplated that
states would be able to enforce federally promulgated regulations. The
purpose of such notification is to give the state the opportunity to abate
Violations of the plan on its own. 10' It seems reasonable to conclude,
then, that the states are to enforce plans promulgated by the EPA
under section 110(c). Two questions arising from that conclusion—
what legal bases support such state enforcement, and what latitude of
interpretation is available to states in enforcing federally promulgated
plans—are examined below.
1. Legal Bases for State Enforcement of Federally
Promulgated Implementation Plans
Three legal bases provide grounds for state enforcement of fed-
erally promulgated implementation plans: section 304 of the Amend-
ments concerning citizens' suits,'" permissible delegation of federal
authority and, finally, displacement of disapproved state law by fed-
eral law.
Citizens' Suits.—Section 304 of the Amendments 108 permits "any
person" to commence a civil action against a polluter who is alleged
to be in violation of an "emission standard or limitation under the
Act." "Person" is defined by section 302(e) of the Amendments' 04
to include a state. "Emission standard or limitation under this Act"
includes a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,
standard of performance or emission standard that is in effect under
an applicable implementation plan."' An "applicable implementation
plan" is the implementation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which
has been approved under section 110(a) or promulgated under section
110(c) and which implements a national primary or secondary air
quality standard in a state.'"
While section 304 was envisioned by Congress primarily as a
100 42 U.S.C. 11 1857c-8(a) (1), (2) (1970). These sections apply to the enforce-
ment of plans approved or promulgated by the Administrator.
101
 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1970) explains:
The conference substitute follows the House bill relating to enforcement in
areas of primary State responsibility and the Senate amendment where primary
Federal responsibility exists. In case of a violation of any requirement of a State
implementation plan, the Administrator is to notify the State in which the vio-
lation occurs as well as the violator. If the violation extends beyond the
day after notification, the Administrator may issue an order requiring com-





104 42 U.S.C.	 1857b (e) (1970).
100 42 U.S.C.	 1857h-2(f) (1970).
100 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(d) (1970).
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means by which private individuals could enforce an implementation
plan if a state and the EPA failed to take appropriate abatement ac-
tion,' there appears to be nothing in the legislative history of the
provision indicating that Congress intended that states qua "persons"
under section 304 could not avail themselves of its provisions. The
legislative reports and floor debates on the 1970 Clean Air Amend-
ments are replete with references to the necessity for state involvement
to achieve the air quality goals, 108 as well as to the primary respon-
sibility of the states in preventing and controlling air pollution at
its source.' 0° Accordingly state enforcement of federally promulgated
emission limitations under section 304 seems consistent with the con-
gressional scheme.
It would appear, then, that a state can use section 304 of the Act
to bring suits for injunctive relief against polluters in violation of a
federally promulgated plan, or a portion thereof, applicable to that
state. Such suits, which are limited to civil relief by section 304, may
be brought in a federal district court.'" However, neither the express
terms of section 304 nor the intent of Congress evidenced in the leg-
islative history underlying that section demands that exclusive juris-
diction of these actions be vested in the federal courts. It is submitted
that these suits may be brought in state courts.' Furthermore, state
courts should not be able to refuse to hear such cases, at least where
107 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970).
108 During floor debate on the 1970 legislation, Senator Gurney noted: "If the fight
against polluted air . . . is to be won we must have a united attack upon it by all
levels of Government: Federal, local, and State . . . ." 116 Cong. Rec. 33075 (1970).
Such sentiments were also voiced in similar circumstances by Senator Muskie, id. at 32902,
and by Senator Cooper, id. at 32918.
10° During consideration of the Senate bill, S. 4358, on the floor, Senator Muskie
stated:
The third major area in which the committee has recommended significant
changes is the area of enforcement. Standards alone will not insure breathable
air. All levels of government must be given adequate tools to enforce those
standards.
The committee remains convinced that the most effective enforcement of
standards will take place on the State and local levels . . . .
Id, at 32902-03 (1970).
In recommending that the House agree to the conference substitute, Congressman
Staggers, one of the bill's managers, noted that the states were to have the primary re-
sponsibility for enforcement of implementation plans. Id. at 42520 (1970). See also
42 U.S.C. § 1857(a) (3) (1970).
110 42 U.S.C. 9 1857h-2(a) (1970).
111 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876), where the Supreme Court
stated:
The general principle . . . [is] that, where jurisdiction may be conferred on the
United States courts, it may be made exclusive where not so by the Constitution
itself ; but, if exclusive jurisdiction be neither expressed nor implied, the State
courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they
are competent to take it. •
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such a refusal would constitute a discrimination against a federal cause
of action."? •
The only remaining question is whether the sixty-day notice re-
quirement of section 304 applies to suits instituted by a state to enforce
a requirement of a federally promulgated plan applicable to that state.
Section 304(b) of the Clean Air Amendment provides in part:
No action may be commenced,
(1) under subsection. (a) (1) pertaining to enforcement of
emission standards and limitations—
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which
the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the
standard, limitation . . . 
. 118
The purpose of this provision is to permit the violator, the state, and
the EPA to take effective abatement action and thus obviate the need
for citizen enforcement. In the case of a state invoking section 304 to
enforce a federally promulgated implementation plan against a pol-
lution source located in that same state, the state's notification to itself
would obviously be unnecessary, though seemingly required under a
literal interpretation of the section. However, notification to the Ad-
ministrator would indicate the state's intention to enforce the plan,
thus eliminating the need for federal enforcement pursuant to section
113. Notification to the alleged violator allows him sixty days to ini-
tiate efforts to comply with regulations. Thus the latter two require-
ments of section 304 (b) would be necessary even where a state brought
a section 304 action.
De4gation of Authority.
	 second possible basis for state en-
forcement of a federally promulgated emission limitation applicable
to the state is that the power to enforce such regulations has been im-
plicitly delegated to the state. There is ample precedent for federal
delegation to state agencies and state courts of the power to enforce
federal laws,114
 and indeed the Clean Air Amendments expressly au-
112 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See also Note, Utilization of State
Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1941).
118 42
•
 U.S.C.	 1857h-2(b) (1970).
114
 The Volstead Act authorized actions to enjoin nuisances defined in the Act
(i.e., places selling liquor) to be brought in state courts in the name of the United States
by any prosecuting attorney of any state or subdivision thereof. Act of Oct. 28, 1919,
ch. 66-85, 41 Stat. 305. See Carse v. Marsh, 189 Cal. 743, 210 P. 257 (1922) ; United States
v. Richards, 201 Wis. 130, 229 N.W. 657 (1930), both involving such actions. See also
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), where the Supreme Court noted that Congress
can authorize state officers to take affidavits, to arrest, and commit for trial, offenders
against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform other duties,
incidental to the judicial power; Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910),
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thorize such a delegation with respect to federally established new
source performance standards!!! and hazardous emission standards. 116
The fact that delegation is expressly provided for in those two instances
and not with respect to state enforcement of federally promulgated
implementation plans does not necessarily foreclose reading the Clean
Air Amendments as delegating the latter authority. It is submitted that
such a delegation to the states may readily be implied from the con-
gressional policy that the prevention and control of air pollution at its
source are the primary responsibility of state and local governments 1 17
Support for this proposition is also apparent in the legislative history
of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, wherein Congress explicitly rec-
ognized the necessity of state action to attain air quality goals within
the time frame prescribed by the AmendmentsP I finally, such an
interpretation is not foreclosed by section 301 of the Amendments,!!'
which allows the Administrator to delegate his powers only to officers
and employees of the EPA, except for the power to promulgate regu-
lations. The delegation of enforcement authority suggested here is made
implicitly by the Amendments,
Assuming an implied delegation of authority to the states to en-
force federally promulgated plans, the question arises as to the manner
in which the states may exercise that authority. The delegation would
seem to entail, at a Minimum, authorization of a state to institute
actions in federal district courts for injunctive relief against violators
of the provisions of the federal plan located in the state. Similarly
state courts would appear to have the authority to grant such relief. 120
The advantage of this delegation theory over a section 304. action is
that no sixty-day notice would be required'?'
The theory of implied delegation might also be seen as authoriz-
ing states to request United States attorneys to institute criminal ac-
tions. Section 113 (c) of the Amendments prescribes criminal pen-
alties for violation of an implementation plan. These sanctions apply,
upholding congressional power to authorize naturalization by state courts; C. Warren,
Federal Criminal Laws, and the State Courts, 38 Hare, L. Rey. 525 (1925), noting that
Congress may authorize skate judicial and other officers to execute federal criminal and
civil - laws. In these cases, exercise of the power delegated was not prohibited by state
law. It is bard to see how state enforcement of a federal plan could be considered as












1 15 See note 11:18 supra,.
110 42 U.S.C. § 1857g(a) (1970).
120
 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
121 While § 113 of the Clean Air Amendinents requires thirty days' notice prior to
the institution of a dvil action, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970), that requirement is , by its
terms, limited to enforcement actions instituted by the Administrator, not the states.
122 42 U.S.C, * 1857c-8(c) (1970).
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however, only where a person knowingly violates a requirement of a
plan during a period of "Mederally assumed enforcement" 123
 or more
than thirty days after the person has been notified by the EPA that
he is violating such requirement,'" and accordingly criminal sanctions
are available to a state under the theory of implied delegation only
in these limited circumstances.
Displacement of Disapproved State Law.—It may be argued that
when the EPA disapproves one or more state-adopted emission lim-
itations and promulgates substitutes, the federal regulations' displace
the disapproved state law for all purposes and may be enforced by the
state in accordance with the state's established enforcement procedures.
Accordingly the state should be able to seek injunctive relief in its own
courts for violation of the federal plan to the same extent that it could
do so had those federal regulations been originally adopted by the
state. Moreover, the state's criminal sanctions for violation of its air
pollution control regulations would attach to violation of the federal
requirements.
Support for this theory may be found in the legislative history
of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments. Section 111(c) of the Senate bill
provided in part:
A plan promulgated by the Secretary for any air quality con-
trol region shall be the plan applicable to such region in the
same manner as if such plan had been adopted by the subject
State and approved by the Secretary . . . .125
This statement may be interpreted to imply that the federally promul-
gated plan has the same status as state law that a plan adopted by a
state and approved by the EPA would have.
This premise is supported by the language of section 110(c) of
the Amendments, which provides for the Administrator's promulgation
of a plan "for a State" if the state fails to submit a satisfactory plan. 120
Moreover, by virtue of the preemptive power of section 116, 127 the
states may not adopt or enforce any emission standard less stringent
than that in effect under an approved or promulgated implementation
plan. An intent to displace state law by a federally promulgated plan
for all purposes might similarly be implied from that provision. Thus
section 111(c) of the Senate bill, and sections 110(c) and 116 of the
Clean Air Amendments, together with the numerous instances in the
committee reports and floor debates on the Amendments indicating
123 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (c) (1) (A) (1) (1970).
124 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(c) (1) (A) (ii) (1970).
125'5, Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1970) (emphasis added).
126 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
127 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
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congressional intent to assist states in attaining air quality góals, 128
and congressional awareness of the need for vigorous state enforcement
activity if those goals were'to be achieved,' provide significant sup-
port for the "displacement" theory:
2. Interpretation of Federally Promulgated State Plans .
The EPA's power to promulgate a plan for a state is limited to
those emission limitations necessary to attain and maintain national
air quality standards. Federal interpretation'of those regulations would
appear to be constrained in the same way. However, to the extent that
a state has authority to enforce a federally promulgated plan, it is
submitted that it may adopt and enforce interpretations of the federal
regulations more stringent than necessary to attain and maintain air
quality standards, and that such state interpretations would be binding
on the federal government. The reasons for such a result have been
discussed above—the policy of the Clean Air Aniendments that states
should have the freedom to adopt and enforce emission limitations
stricter than necessary to achieve air quality goals, and the need for
uniformity of interpretation of the same regulations."
•
B. The Application of Section 110(c) to State Enabling Acts
The exact reach of federal power under section 110(c) of the
Clean Air Amendments' 31 has not been clearly defined. Section 110(c)
requires the Administrator to impose an implementation plan or por-
tion thereof on a state if the state fails to submit any plan under
section 110(a) (1), or if the state plan submitted fails toineet federal
requirements, or if the state fails,. after notification by the Adminis-
trator, to revise a defective implementation plan. It is a necessary
adjunct to any state's compliance with the mandate of the Clean Air
Amendments that that state formulate some kind of enabling legisla-
tion establishing a state environmental enforcement agency and setting
forth its authority and standards by which it is to operate. 1 °2 'A ques-
128 In discussing the Senate bill, S. 4358, Senator Muskie noted: "LW le have learned
from experience with implementation of the law that States and localities need greater
incentives and assistance to protect the health and welfare of all people." 116 Cong. Rec.
32901 (1970). See also H.R. Rep. No: 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970): "[III is
urgent that Congress adopt new clean air legislation which will make possible the more
expeditious imposition of specific emission standards both for mobile and stationary
sources and the effective enforcement of such standards by both State and Federal agen-
cies."
123 See note 108 supra.
130 See text at notes 20, 42-43 supra.
131 42 U.S.C.	 1857c-5(c) (1970).
182 See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 22398 (1971), requiring that each plan'show that the state
agency has the requisite legal authority to carry out the plan.
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tion arises, whether, should this basic gate enahling - legislation fall
short of that required to attain national ail quallty standards. within
the ;WC, the Administrato• has power 11 1 :1qf 1t9(c) to 4.PWPSI the
underlying state legislative grant of gigot-4y,,
This question arose in the context of a still undecided case in the
First Circuit. 11P The Rhode Island Clean Air- Act provides that the Di,
CgCt9r. of
 the PCPatttillfMt 1. 1.C.1141 bas the 4,14Ority
[tio issue, modify, amend or revoke such orders prohibiting
or abating air pollution as are in accord with the Purposes of
this chapter and the rules and regulations promulgated here-
under. In making the orders hereunder authorized; the direc-
tor shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited
to, population density, air pollntion levels, the character and
degree of injury to health or physical property and the ego,
non* and social necessity of the spurge of air pollution  „134
Section 23-25-8(a) of the same statute provides as follows:
If any person is causing air pollution and if after investiga,
tion and hearing the director shall so find, he may enter an
order directing such person to adopt or to use, eV: to operate
properly, as the case may be; some practicable and reason-
ably available control system or device or means to prevent
such pollution, having due regard for the rights and interests
of all persons concerned . • -.14
The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), plaintiffs in
the First Circuit case, challenged the Administrator's approval of these
provisions on the ground that they contravene the policy of the Clean
Air Amendments, arguing that the Amendments do not permit cal?
nomic, social, and technical factors to be taken into consideration in
determining whether violators should be compelled to comply with
applicable emission limitations 18°- The NRDC. alleged that the provi-
sions of the Rhode Island Act quoted above permit the Rhode Island
Director of Health, when enforcing state regulation, to take into ac-
count just §11Ch'IdetCtCC1 COnsidggiOT,
The legislatiiie history of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, as
they apply to regulations designed to attain primary standards, appears
138 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, Civil No.
June 28, 1972).
134 R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 23, ch. 25, § 23-25,5(4) (1965).
185 R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 23, ch. 25, 23-25-8(a) (1968).
!Ms Brief for Petitionota a1 24,A1, Natural R4012FCC5 Defense_
Civil No. 72-1219 (1st Cir., filed June 28, 1972).
72-1219 (1st Cir., Bled
council, Inc, v. EPA,
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to support the NRDes position. The Senate Public Works Committee
Report stated:
In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was ex-
pressed regarding the use of the concept of technical feasi-
bility as the basis of ambient air standards. The Committee
determined that 1) the health of people is more important
than the question of whether the early achievement of am-
bient air quality standards protective of health is technically
feasible; and, 2) the growth of pollution load in many areas,
even with application of available technology, would still be
deleterious to public health. Therefore, the Committee de-
termined that existing sources of pollutants either should
meet the standard of the law or be closed down . .
Assuming that the Rhode Island enabling legislation does limit
the state agency's enforcement powers by requiring it to consider eco-
nomic, social, and technological factors specifically ruled out by Con-
gress, and that consideration of such factors might prevent the timely
attainment of maintenance of national air quality standards, a serious
question arises under section 110 of the Clean Air Amendments. This
question is whether section 110(c) gives the Administrator the power,
in effect, to amend the state's grant of authority to a state agency, in
this case the Rhode Island Department of Health, so as to give the
agency sufficient authority to comply with the purposes of the Clean
Air Amendments.
There is no provision in the Clean Air Amendments expressly
excluding such a use of section 110(c). Some of the same arguments
used to support the state enforcement of federally promulgated regu-
lations might be invoked here to support using section 110(c) to enable
the Administrator to give a state agency more authority than the leg-
islature had delegated to le" Section 110 (a) (2) (F),13° which specifi-
cally requires states to provide assurances that they will give their
agencies adequate legal authority to carry out their implementation
plans, indicates a congressional assumption that adequate statutory
authority must be provided. Furthermore, while the legislative history
suggests that Congress expected states to provide their own enforce-
ment agencies with sufficient statutory authority to implement the
requirements of the Clean Air Amendments,"° such expectation would
181 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
138 See text at notes 102-29 supra.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(F) (1970).
140 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970): "[T]he States would be
expected to have or to obtain adequate authority to insure that the provisions of the Act
are enforced."
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not necessarily mean that Congress relegated so essential a matter
wholly to the states. Failure of states to provide adequate authority
might prevent attainment of the air quality goals of the Amendments.
Limitations in funding and manpower make it very unlikely that re-
liance on federal enforcement as the principal method of forcing com-
pliance with regulations will be sufficient to achieve national air stan-
dards. Congress realized that the assistance of the states was absolutely
essential in attaining air quality goals."' Given the high priority which
Congress placed on those goals, it is hard to impute to it an intent to
deny the means of achieving them. Thus it is submitted that the goals
of the Clean Air Amendments require that section 110(c) be inter-
preted as giving the Administrator the authority to amend defective
state grants of authority. Finally—despite the fact that legislative his-
tory provides little guidance on this matter—section 110(c) should
be read to give as broad as possible authority; otherwise, given the
questionable adequacy of some state air pollution control statutes,
the purposes of the Clean Air Amendments may never be attained in
those states.
CONCLUSION
The 1970 Clean Air Amendments opened a Pandora's box of ques-
tions pertaining to the interrelationship of state and federal law in the
area of air pollution control. Extensive litigation appears to be required
to hammer out clear answers to these questions. It is hoped that the
answers will hasten rather than delay the expeditious attainment and
maintenance across the nation of air quality levels consistent with pub-
lic health and welfare.
To the extent that judicial resolutions of issues create friction
between federal and state governments, they will hinder the attainment
of the air quality goals of the Clean Air Amendments. It is submitted
that the approaches to various issues suggested in this article may
avoid unnecessary federal-state friction by permitting states a relative
degree of freedom to adjust their programs to problems as they arise,
as well as by creating opportunities for increased participation by the
states in air pollution regulation.
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